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PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHOR:
THE PHILOSOPHERS AMBIVALENCE
Paul Crittenden
T HAT AIUSTOTLE-'the philosopher' in medieval parlance-wasambivalent about metaphor is well known. In various places he is
critical and dismissive of its use, yet in the Poetics and Rhetoric he pro-
vides a positive account, on the lines that metaphors involve insight
and convey learning and understanding. A simple comment might be
that he is willing to allow that metaphor has its place, while holding
that that place is not in philosophy. There is some truth in this, but
it does not do justice to the complexity of the issues, including his
willingness to see a kinship between metaphor-making and philo-
sophical acuity around the common capacity to 'see resemblances
even in things far apart'.
One aspect of the puzzle is that in his primary discussion of
metaphor in the Rhetoric, Aristotle makes considerable use of the very
figure ofspeech that he dismisses at other points. This is a feature of his
ambivalence about metaphor that G.E.R. Lloyd explores in his paper
'The metaphors of metaphora' (Lloyd, 1996). Given that Aristotle's
'explicit account ofmetaphora, in the Rhetoric and Poetics, relies very heav-
ily on the very language-use that [his] official theory condemns', Lloyd
asks 'Why is there so much metaphor, so much metaphora, indeed, in
Aristotle's theory ofmetaphora?'(p.205). It won't do to say that in writing
on drama and rhetoric Aristotle was not engaged in philosophy or not
in a 'really serious' sense. For even if this were true it would not resolve
the issue, since he also makes frequent use of metaphor in his writings
on ethics, politics, science and metaphysics. This suggests that he recog-
nised in some sense that there is a place for metaphor, not only in poet-
ry and rhetoric, but in philosophy as well.
The sense in which metaphor might be at home in philosophy is a
large question, going well beyond anything Aristotle might have
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recognised in regard to his own philosophy. Writing of Plato's use of
metaphor, Iris Murdoch says that 'of course he used metaphor; but
philosophy needs metaphor and metaphor is basic; how basic is the
most basic philosophical question' (1997, P.463). Her point, I think, is
that metaphor is critical to a good deal of philosophy, notably in
ethics, politics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and
metaphysics. There is also the looming presence of Heidegger's
analysis of western metaphysics as the source of overarching
metaphors, especially the metaphors of the sun and the ground-foun-
dation, expressed in his view that 'the metaphorical exists only with-
in the metaphysical'. Again, there is the challenge set by Derrida's
treatment of metaphor, not least in relation to Aristotelian philoso-
phy, in 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy'
(Derrida 1986). This turns on the idea that, in Paul Ricoeur's words,
'there is no discourse on metaphor that is not stated within a
metaphorically engendered conceptual network' (Ricoeur 1997,
P· 287)·
The idea that there is no escape from metaphor might indeed start
with Aristotle's definition of meta/lkJIDl in the Poetics as epiP/2fmJ., 'car-
rying across' as 'carrying to', metaphor as a form of transport, moving
something from one place to another. Metaphor--elearly Aristotle
speaks in a more inclusive and general sense than the term now
holds--eonsists in the transposition of a term to an unusual context.
The play on words, obviously, is not picked up in the standard English
translation: 'metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that
belongs to something else'. (Poetics, 1457b8ff). In drawing attention to
the pervasive web of metaphor, Derrida goes on to argue that philos-
ophy as a whole is a 'process of metaphorization which gets carried
away in and of itself'; and here his primary example is Aristotle's
metaphysics, especially the idea of the analogy of being, taken as an
extended albeit unacknowledged metaphor.
One thing that is completely clear is that an adequate treatment
of philosophy and metaphor is not a project for a short paper. So hav-
ing noted these large questions thrown up in the attempt to decon-
struct Western metaphysics in the twentieth century, my intention is
to place them offstage (for the most part) to await appearance on
another occasion. For now, a direct consideration of Aristotle's
account of metaphor and its place is an appropriate point to make a
start. On this topic, as on many others, Aristotle is going where Plato
had been before. As with Plato, his intervention is part of an ongoing
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polemic between philosophy and rival spheres of influence in educa-
tion and public life. But more fully than Plato, he took metaphor as
a topic for formal reflection and sought to work out a compromise,
albeit one in which philosophy would have the last word.
Aristotle's criticism of metaphor appears most pointedly in his
writings on logic. The development of syllogistic argument depends
not least on definition and clarity in the use of terms. There is no
place for metaphorical expressions in this context since, as he says
without more ado, 'a metaphorical expression is always obscure':
Another rule [in avoiding obscurity in definitions} is to
see if a metaphorical expression has been used. For a
metaphorical expression is always obscure [asaphes}
(Topics) 39b32ff)
Ob.scurity, in a word, is the death of definition and formal argument.
But comments critical of metaphor also occur commonly enough in
the Metaphysics and other writings.
In particular, there is the stinging dismissal of Plato's theory of
Forms:
But further all other things cannot come from the Forms
in any of the usual senses of 'form'. And to say that the
Forms are patterns [of things] and thc other things share
thcm is to use empty words and poetical metaphors.
(Metaphysics 99Ia21-2; (c( 1079b25-7»
The irony of criticising Plato in this way could hardly have been lost
on Aristotle: in setting boundaries between philosophy and other
genres, the guiding philosophical idea of his teacher is placed dismis-
sively outside philosophy. That he says nothing more about this rele-
gation must appear as one of the deep absences in philosophy. For
what does it say about philosophy if Plato's deep thought, which cer-
tainly draws on metaphor, is not philosophy? The criticism of Empe-
dodes' use of metaphor in the Meteorology is more straightforward:
It is equally absurd to suppose that anything has been
explained by calling the sea 'the sweat of the earth', like
EmpedoCies. Metaphors are poetical-the expression
may satis/)' the rcquirements of a poem, but as to knowl-
edge of nature it is unsatisfactory (Meteorology 357a24-6).
This comment serves to bring out a more general contention, to the
effect that metaphors are not reliable sources of knowledge-in this
case knowledge of nature---even jf they satisfy the requirements of
poetry {though in criticising Empedodes' philosophy he also dis-
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missed him as a poor poet). Consistently with this, he allows that a
metaphor is acceptable where it reflects knowledge otherwise avail-
able: so the comic poets are said to make a good metaphor in jest in
calling grey hair 'the mould of old age' and 'hoar-frost' because, as he
holds, these descriptions resonate with the scientific explanation of
the phenomenon (see Generation ofAnimals 784a25ff).
The extended treatment of metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric is
of an entirely different order, guided by the thesis that metaphor is
of great value in poetry and prose of all kinds (though philosophy
itself as we will see, whether spoken or written, falls largely beyond
consideration). The analysis of metaphor in these texts turns on a
model of language marked by a contrast between the strict, proper or
ordinary use of terms and a variety of non-standard or deviant uses:
Whatever its structure, a term will always be either the
ordinary [kurion] word for the thing, or a strange word,
or a metaphor, or an ornamental word, or a coined word,
or a word extended, or shortened, or altered in form
(Poetics 1457bJff).
This is linked with an emphasis on the importance of clarity:
to be good, language must be clear [saphe]. It must also be
appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue evalua-
tion. Clearness is secured by using words that are current
and ordinary [k/lrion] (Rhetoric 1404b2ff).
Behind this there is the logico-metaphysical ideal that for each word
there would be a single sense:
It makes no difference to say that a word has several
meanings, if only they are limited in number; for to each
formula there might be assigned a different word.
For instance we might say that 'man' has not one meaning
but several, one of which would be defined as 'two-footed
animal', while there might be several other formulae if
only they are limited in number; for to each formula there
might be assigned a different word .... lf, however, they
were not limited but one were to say that the word has an
infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would
be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no
meaning, and if words have no meaning, reasoning with
other people and indeed with oneself has been annihi-
lated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do
not think of one thing; bur if this is possible, one name
might be assigned to this thing. Let it be assumed
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(P.1457b8)
a//otrion-belonging to
another, strange
then ... that the name has a meaning and has one meaning
(Metaphysics 1006a34 ff)
'A word may have several meanings if only they are limited in number:
for to each formula there might be assigned a different word'. This, as
Derrida sees it, is the heart of philosophy: 'Univocity is the essence,
or better, the telos of language. No philosophy, as such, has ever
renounced this Aristotelian ideal. This ideal is philosophy' (Derrida
1986, P.247). That is an issue for debate. But, as Geoffrey Lloyd
argues in Aristotelian explorations, there is good evidence that Aristotle
himself, having enunciated the high ideal of univocity, was prepared
to set it aside in many contexts and to allow for a more pluralistic,
diverse play of meanings. So, in contrast with the dismissal of
metaphor as 'always obscure' in the 7Opics, he insists in the Rhetoric
(1405a4ff) that the appropriate use of non-standard terms is of fun-
damental importance for good style and that metaphor in particular
giv"es 'clearness, charm and distinction' as nothing else can.
This endorsement of metaphor comes replete with liberal use of
metaphorical expressions, beginning as already noted with the defi-
nition of metaphor in the Poetics:
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs
to something else [onamatos al/otriou epiphora}; the trans-
ference being either from genus to species, or from
species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds
of analogy (Poetics 1457b7ff).
A simple list of the terms Aristotle invokes in discussing
metaphor, in the Poetics (P) and Book III of the Rhetoric (R), marks
the metaphorical turn:
Metaphors d.<:
unusual (terms)
In contrast with:
strict, proper (terms)
ordinary (terms)
kurios-one in authority,
head of family,
word in common use (R.l404b6)
oikeion ef. 'of the
household', familiar,
one's own
Metaphors as conferring:
clearness
charm, pleasure
to saphes
to hedu
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The extensive use of metaphor in this context is remarkable, espe-
cially metaphors of life and movement to express what is character-
istic of metaphor. There are manifestly tensions in the account, as in
the primary idea that clearness is secured by using ordinary words;
yet, language, he goes on to say, is enhanced by an element of the
unfamiliar and metaphors are said to provide clearness as nothing
else can (in contrast with the TOpics where metaphors are roundly crit-
icised as unclear). Again, metaphors lend distinction as having an
exotic air, but what is foreign might also carry a sense of threat. The
emphasis clearly falls, nonetheless, on the positive endorsement of
metaphor in poetry and prose of all kinds.
In setting out conditions for the use of metaphor, Aristotle stress-
es in particular the need for them to be appropriate or fitting, which
means that they 'must correspond to the thing signified' as a cloak
needs to fit the person who wears it (Rhetoric, 1405alOfO. Now, a
metaphor, in its structure, says 'this is that' (Rhetoric 14IObI8), for
example that old age is 'the evening' or 'sunset of life'. The basic con-
dition for its use, therefore, is that this ~ like that in some significant
respect-as between species or between species and genus, or more
generally 'in keeping with an analogy'. Some kind of similarity at the
(R.t4 0 5aIO)
(R.'408aIOff)
(R. J411 b25ff)
(R.J 4" b27-J 2a9)
prepOI/sa
harmottei
kekosmemenos
to metrion
to xenikon- foreign, exotic
pro ommaton poiein
energeia / energol/nta
kinesis/ kinol/mena
zonta; empsl/ch"
Metaphors as needing to be:
appropriate, seemly
fitting
ornamented
within a mean
distinction
Metaphors as needing to avoid:
frigidiry (in language) to pJllchron
Metaphors liS dynamic, graphic:
lively (sayings) ta asteill-of the city,
urbane, witry, vivid
taking (sayings) ta e/ldoko/lmenta-
well-esteemed,
popular, effective
'setting something
before the eyes'
activiry / active
movement / moving
alive / living; animate
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level of how things are thus grounds metaphors and gives them their
truth. The relevant general principle, as in Rhetoric 1405 bJI is that
'one term may describe a thing more truly (more strictly) than anoth-
er, be more appropriate (more at home), and set it more intimately
before our eyes'. It is a matter of degree as to how well one thing fits
another, though in some instances a metaphor may be entirely inap-
propriate and therefore, as I interpret it, false. Of course, Aristotle
speaks of other conditions as needed for a good metaphor, that it is
not too far-fetched or too obvious (hence that it fall within a mean),
that it have a pleasing sound, and so on.
To be a master of metaphor-'to metaphorise well' according to
the Poetics-is to have a capacity for seeing similarity in dissimilars
(1458a6-8) The Rhetoric makes the same point in a passage that asso-
ciates metaphor-making with philosophical acuity:
Metaphors must be drawn from things that are related to
the original, and yet not so obviously - just as in philos-
ophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even
in things far apart (1412alOfO
The dialectical counterpart is addressed in the TOpics in the need for
the philosopher to study likeness and difference, especially to get
practice in regard to terms that are far apart:
Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things
belonging to different genera, the formula being: as one is
to one thing, so is another to another (e.g. as knowledge
stands to an object of knowledge, so is perception related
to the object of perception, or: as one is in one thing, so
is another in another (e.g. as sight is in the eye, so is intel-
lect in the soul, and as is calm in the sea, so is windless-
ness in the. air). Practice is more 'especially needed in
regard to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the
rest, we shall be more easily able to see the points of
likeness (Topics 108a6fO.
What does this association around the perception of similarity say about
philosophy and metaphor? To go further one needs to consider what
Aristotle says about the cognitive dimension of metaphor, especially
its role in expressing new ideas or different ways of looking at things.
Recent views concerning metaphor divide on two main lines. For
some, in keeping with the 'classical' view, metaphors-and related fig-
ures of speech-eonsist essentially in the substitution of a figurative
term for a proper or literal term; as such, the metaphor is purely lex-
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ical, a linguistic ornamentation that does not convey knowledge in its
own right. The opposing view is that metaphors have the power to
redescribe the world, to provide new ways of seeing things and hence
to convey knowledge. Paul Ricoeur is perhaps the most eloquent
recent proponent of this view; and in The Rule ofMetaphor he argues
that Aristotle can be interpreted as subscribing to, or at least point-
ing towards, an approach of this kind. Not everyone would agree,
however, that Ricoeur is right in his reading of Aristotle. What does
the text say?
Aristotle's remarks on the cognitive value of metaphor are to be
found primarily in the Rhetoric, Book I II, chs. 10 and JJ. In providing
advice on the way 'to devise lively and taking sayings', he speaks of
the pleasure we feel in learning things, in getting hold of a new idea
or new fact, and goes on to say that metaphors arc particularly impor-
tant in this connection:
We may now go on to say something about the way to
devise lively and taking sayings.... We will begin by remark-
ing that we all naturally find it agreeable to get hold of new
ideas easily: words express ideas, and therefore those words
are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new
ideas. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words
convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor
that we can get hold of something fresh. When the poet
calls old age 'a withered stalk'. he conveys a new idea [math-
esinJ. a new fact fgnosinJ. to us by means of the general
notion 'lost bloom'. which is common to both things. The
similes of the poets do the same ... We see then that speech
and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize
a new idea promptly (Rhetoric 14IOb7-20)
The association of learning and pleasure in this passage echoes the
famous opening words of the Metaphysics (980b22fO: ~II men by nature
desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our
senses'; and also the remark in the Poetics (1448b8fO about human
delight in mimesis as linked with pleasure in learning about things.
The claim, on the face of it, is that metaphors convey learning and
knowledge, specifically in a way that is lively, pleasurable, and
prompt. In this connection, he continues, metaphors by analogy-
the proportional kind (B is to A as 0 is to C)-arc the most effective:
Of the four kinds of metaphor the most taking is the pro-
portional kind. Thus Pericles. for instance, said that the
vanishing from the country of the young men who. had
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fallen in the war was 'as if the spring were taken out of the
year' (Rhetoric '411 a I fO
Further, metaphors work by 'making our hearers see things', they
present a picture with an interpretation that draws us to connect
things and to think of them in a new or different way:
It has alreany heen mentionen that liveliness is got by
using the proportional typc of metaphor and by making
our hearers see things.... By 'making them see things' I
mean using expressions that represent things as in a state
of activity..... So with Homer's common practice of giving
metaphorical life to lifeless things: all such passages are
distinguished hy the effect of the activity they convey.
Thus,
'Downwarn at oncc to the valley rebounned the
houlder remorseless'; and
'Thc arrow tlew eagerly'; .....
In [all} these examples the things have the effect of being
active because they are made into living beings... the pact
represents everything as moving and living; and activity is
movement (Rhetoric J411b24fO.
The suggestion is that the art of the metaphor-maker is to repre-
sent things as moving, active, and living. But the characterisation of
things on these lines must be the expression of some real resemblance.
So the metaphor-maker and the philosopher are drawn together in
their capacity 'to perceive resemblances even in things far apart'.
But what is Aristotle really saying here? In a recent paper, Andre
Laks argues that it is a mistake to suppose that he credits metaphor
with cognitive value in the Rhetoric, or at least with anything more
than subordinate value. The source of knowledge lies elsewhere. The
argument turns on two main considerations. The first is that, for
Aristotle, metaphor has a purely substitutional structure, consisting
in the substitution of an unusual word for an ordinary one. Secondly,
metaphors presuppose resemblance between the related elements.
The critical point in this regard is that the recognition of resem-
blances is a matter of intelligent perception or investigation: that is
the ground on which metaphors, if appropriate, have their force. In
this vein, as noted above, Aristotle dismisses Empedocles' metaphor-
ical description of the sea as 'the sweat of the earth' as bad science;
by contrast he praises the comic poet's metaphor that speaks ofgrey
hair as the 'hoar-frost of old age' because it fits with a scientific
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rationale. The point in either case is that one looks to physics for the
knowledge, not the metaphor.
But doesn't Aristotle credit the metaphor-maker with a capacity
for seeing resemblances? Yes, but to take up Laks' response, the rele-
vant knowledge is embodied in the perception of similarity, and only
in the metaphor at a remove. The moment of perception might be fol-
lowed more or less immediately by the leap to metaphor. But the cog-
nitive force of the chosen metaphor depends on the knowledge
acquired in perception (or inquiry) which is originally designated by
the proper term for which the metaphor is a substitute. More gener-
ally, the interpretation continues, the task of finding similarities lies
properly with the philosopher or student of nature. As evidence of
this, Aristotle makes the study of sameness and difference a funda-
mental theme in philosophical inquiry (as seen in the passage in the
7Opics, I08a6ff., quoted above; and he notes in the Rhetoric, 1393a4, that
the power to think out analogies is developed by philosophy). The
Aristotelian implication, so Laks suggests, is that the better one is as
a philosopher, the better one will be, potentially at least, at thinking
up good metaphors. This part of the argument is surely a flight of
fancy, however, for when metaphors are in question Aristotle almost
always takes his examples from poets and orators, not philosophers.
Of course, a philosophical example is called for when, in the Rhetoric
(1412aIOff), he credits the metaphor-maker with something compara-
ble to philosophical acuity in seeing resemblances in things far apart.
At this point one might suppose that he would turn to Plato or per-
haps draw on one of his own uses of metaphor. What he offers in fact
is a rather flat example from the Pythagorean Archytas who said 'that
an arbitrator and an altar were the same since the injured fly to both
for justice'. It seems clear that Aristotle does not suppose that a talent
for metaphor can be found primarily in the philosophical domain even
if the capacity for uncovering similarities across boundaries is a mark
of both the philosopher and the poet and rhetorician.
One obvious problem for the substitutional analysis is that some
metaphors occur in the absence of any existing 'proper' term for
which they could serve as a substitute. Aristotle notes this, without
any apparent concern, in the Poetics (and in passing in the Rhetoric):
It may be that some of the terms thus related {in a pro-
portional metaphor] have no special name of their own,
but for all that they will be described in just the same way.
Thus ro cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but ro cast
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forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name.
This nameless act, however, stands in just the same rela-
tion to its ohject, sunlight, as sowing to the seed-corn.
Hence the expression in the poet 'sowing 3round a god-
created flame' (Poetics 1457b25ff; cf. Rhetoric 14°5335-6).
In Aristotle's analysis of the metaphor 'sowing around a god-created
flame', the action of sowing (B) stands to what is cast forth, seed-corn
(A) as the 'casting-forth flame' action of the sun (D) stands to sunlight
(C). In Greek, however, there was no specific term for (D), the rele-
vant action of the sun (as in English with the transitive verb 'to
beam'). This lacuna, filled by the metaphor, does not concern
Aristotle in principle for he notes elsewhere that 'names are finite ...
while things are infinite' (Sophistical Refutations. 165alO). More pre-
cisely, the analogy, on which the metaphor rests, is not affected by the
absence of a specific (ordinary) term. Given this, Laks presses his
argument that, as with the other cases, the application of the
metaphor to the 'nameless act', while enriching the language,
depends on prior knowledge. The poet can speak of 'sowing around
a god-created flame' in terms of having discerned a likeness between
the sower casting corn seed and the sun casting its light.
According to this deflationary account, then, Aristotle treats
metaphors as essentially figures of speech, not as forms of knowledge
except that they might be accorded a subordinate cognitive function.
The suggestion is that their particular role is to communicate an idea
in an arresting and readily digested form, to serve, for example, as a
dramatic device, or a teaching aid, in getting one's audience to grasp
connections with ease and to feel pleasure in the experience. But here
the deflationary view holds that the pleasure that accompanies learn-
ing by metaphor arises, not in knowledge as such, but in the mode of
its acquisition, specifically that the learning is effortless or easy. A
good metaphor conveys the pleasure of surprise, is readily grasped,
and effects learning without toil or tears. Metaphors in short enhance
language, poetry or prose, and are useful in conveying ideas in that
they provide maximum effect for minimum effort. Hence their value
in poetry or drama and their appeal to the rhetorician.
Can this be the right account of what Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics
might have to tell us about metaphor? Laks' argument, as I noted earlier,
is directed specifically against Ricoeur's reading of Aristotle as contribut-
ing to a larger, and only recently recaptured, understanding of meta-
phor in its power, especially in certain fictions, to redescribe reality.
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As a step towards developing his own extended account of
metaphor, Ricoeur's first concern is to criticise the view that the sub-
stitutional analysis represents Aristotle's ultimate thinking about
metaphor. This begins with a focus on the dynamism of the 'epipho-
ra' of 'metaphora' and the idea that the process of movement is not
simply that of replacing one word for another (or occasionally filling
a semantic lacuna in the absence of an ordinary term). A metaphor
associates different networks of meaning and, while it deviates from
the ordinary in moving across categories, the transgression leads to
something new and meaningful. Aristotle's succinct definition admit-
tedly focuses on metaphor as a part of speech, the noun or name
(onamatos allotriou epiphora'. But it is clear from his larger treatment
of the topic that a metaphor, structurally, has the form of a state-
ment, saying in a word that 'this' is 'that'. This emerges explicitly in
connection with Aristotle's assimilation of simile (eikon) and
metaphor: 'the simile is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way
it is put' (Rhetoric I4IObI6j and see I406b20). Most pertinently
among the slight differences to which he adverts, the simile, unlike
the metaphor, 'does not say outright that "this" is "that" (making it,
in his view, less effective in getting attention). In either case, the
assertion rests on the ground of resemblance, allowing, as Ricoeur
says, that 'the metaphorical "is" at once signifies both "is not" and "is
like'" (Ricoeur, p.?). This leads to the conclusion that, in making con-
nections across categories, metaphors have the power to redescribe
the world and effect enlarged understanding. In particular 'metaphor
is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that
certain fictions have to redescribe reality ... {and to do so] in the man-
ner of scientific models' (p.?, 305) This, Ricoeur argues, is the force of
Aristotle's discovery in the Poetics that 'the poiesis of language arises
out of the connection between muthos and mimesis' (PP·7, 37-43).
Language, according to Aristotle in the Rhetoric, needs to be
appropriate, avoiding meanness on the one hand and excess on the
other. In terms of this framework, I would suggest that if Ricoeur
tends to go roo far in what he finds in the Aristotelian treatment of
metaphor, Laks tends in the direction of meanness. Ricoeur arguably
reads beyond the text in moving towards his enlarged account of
metaphor, but in the process he draws out Aristotelian themes that
richly merit development. Laks, on the other hand, provides a read-
ing that works closely with the text, yet one that draws too little from
Aristotle's rapprochement with metaphor. A detailed assessment of
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Ricoeur's Aristotelian insights and Laks' critical response lies beyond
the scope of this paper. But in the terms set out above, I think that
Ricoeur is on firm ground in finding ideas in Aristotle's own writings
that put in question a purely substitutional analysis of metaphor.
A further consideration arises in relation to Laks' critical con-
tention that the knowledge associated with metaphor belongs to the
intelligent perception of the relevant similarity, and not properly its
expression. This argument seems to rely on an artificial, strained sep-
aration between thought and language. By parity of reasoning one
would be drawn equally to the completely implausible view that the
intelligent perception of similarities could function apart from ordi-
nary (non-metaphorical) terms or, indeed, apart from language at all.
Does one who is a 'master of metaphor' (Poetics 1459a6) always pro-
ceed by perceiving a likeness then finding the appropriate metaphor
to capture it? But on what grounds could one rule our that, in the
matter of finding resemblances, a rich command of language and
insight go hand in hand and that in some cases the capacity to find
the metaphor is the very discovery and expression of the insight?
That would be a basis for attributing a form of knowledge to the poet
or the rhetorician precisely as a maker of metaphors. A third consid-
eration, which I will take up a little more fully, relates to the earlier
topic of Aristotle's own use of metaphor in treating of metaphor. My
argument will follow G.E. R. Lloyd's exploration of the topic in major
respects (Lloyd 1996).
The significance of the metaphorical presence rurns in part on the
genre of the Poetics and the Rhetoric. No one would suppose that in
writing on poetry Aristotle was assuming the mantle of poet. A trea-
tise on rhetoric, however, especially in the broad terms in which he
conceived it, could well display in practice what it recommends. If
the Rhetoric is an example of rhetoric, it would not be in the least sur-
prising, as Lloyd observes, that metaphors are invoked to lend 'clear-
ness, charm, and distinction' to the argument (and to convey relevant
knowledge with ease).
Against this, however, the text does not fit into any of the three
main forms of rhetoric---deliberative, forensic and epideictic-to
which Aristotle refers in c1assitying the subject. Furthermore, he used
metaphor commonly enough in his major philosophical writings. So
its appearance in the Rhetoric would not in itself be a reason for
thinking that this text is not a piece of philosophical writing. Hut if
the Rhetoric is a form of philosophy, should it be classified as an exer-
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cise in dialectic-argument from generally accepted opinions-or as
a branch of practical philosophy along with ethics and politics?
While the art of persuasion is concerned with arguments 'from signs
and likelihoods', the case for treating rhetoric as a branch of political
science, and hence as practical philosophy, seems more persuasive. In
this light, in seeking to clarify an important domain of argument, the
treatise has the practical aim of making people better at engaging in
argument in the public sphere, better able to assess the arguments of
others, and in these respects better members of the body politic.
In treating of Aristotle's use and endorsement of metaphor in these
sources, Lloyd argues persuasively that here, as in many other areas of
his thought, there is a divergence between the official theory and his
actual practice. The official theory characteristically appears as a strict
philosophical ideal. In practice, however, his approach is considerably
more flexible, open, and adapted to context. In this case, in the major
writings in metaphysics, ethics and politics, and on nature, where argu-
ment with other philosophers is prominent, he draws on the power of
metaphor at various points while continuing to hold to the official line
of disapproval. In the treatises on poetry and rhetoric, while there is
clearly a sub-text of argument with Plato, he is not engaged so directly
in criticising philosophical opponents or in projecting an image of the
pure philosopher. In this situation, he sets aside some of the con-
straints imposed by theory and draws extensively, and happily, on the
resources of metaphor (Lloyd, pp.219-22).
One consideration is that in analysing metaphor, Aristotle would
have found it difficult, if not impossible, to avoid metaphorical
expressions. With his remarkable ability for coining technical terms,
he might perhaps have sought to devise non-metaphorical substitutes
at this point. But it is highly unlikely that any such 'strange' terms
would have been clearer or more appropriate than the galaxy of
metaphorical expressions he actually invokes in throwing light on
metaphor and its uses. The metaphors on which he draws in this con-
text are not mere figures of speech or teaching aids to make learning
easy, but integral elements in what he knows and understands in this
field of inquiry. The use of these standard metaphorical terms could
be seen, indeed, as throwing into question the starting point of his
inquiry, namely, the idea that there is a sharp division between prop-
er and ordinary words, so-called, and metaphors (and other strange or
unusual terms). This is not to say, however, that Aristotle himself was
drawn in that direction.
RIIII Crittenden
Part of his confidence in using metaphor in discussing rhetoric is
that the philosopher places himself and his writing outside the scope
of the subject. There is reference to prose of all kinds, spoken or
written, but the focus is on speeches in political assemblies, law-
courts, and the like. That-along with poetry-is the overt context
in which the use of metaphor is commended. But this points to a ten-
sion that affects practice as well as theory. Aristotle supposes that
everyone has some interest in rhetoric and dialectic 'to the extent
that everyone attempts to discuss statements and to maintain them,
to defend their views and attack the views of others' (Rhetoric '354b5-
7). He also notes that rhetorical skills are important in teaching (ef.
Rhetoric '404a8ff). But the question of how these considerations
relate to teaching and writing in philosophy, including his own prac-
tice, is left unexamined.
In reflecting on poetry and rhetoric, Aristotle was happy to
acknowledge that metaphorical invention involves genuine insight
and conveys learning and pleasure. Nevertheless, for all his apprecia-
tion of poets and metaphors at this point, he did not suppose that
they might play an important heuristic role in such fields as physics
or metaphysics, psychology, ethics or political inquiry. The critical
consideration here is not, as Laks supposes, that there is a gap
between the intelligent perception of a resemblance and its expres-
sion in a telling metaphor. What Aristotle might say is that
metaphors reveal insight and convey learning and knowledge, but in
an isolated or incomplete way, not so as to form a body of knowledge
in a given field of inquiry. In the conditions he sets elsewhere for
knowledge, the insight achieved in metaphor would need to be
referred to a properly organised field of inquiry. Again, metaphor as
a redescription of the world in this way or that presupposes, or looks
to, a more general account of the relevant domain. Finally, even if the
poets and other metaphor-makers have a kinship with philosophy,
judgment concerning knowledge is referred back to the philosopher,
the keeper of the sciences. What is more, the views of philosophers
too, even if they are one's friends, must come before the same tribu-
nal. In this competitive framework, the philosopher's formal disap-
proval of metaphor stands with full force. So the sentence 'guilty of
poetical metaphor' serves to dismiss Plato's metaphysics.
Aristotle assumed naturally that his own metaphysics escaped any
such charge. The test case, had he considered it, relates especially to
what he says about the analogy of being, for this idea runs across his
4'
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metaphysics, including the versatile concepts of actuality and poten-
tiality, and matter and form, and it is critical to his account of the
causes, principles or elements of things. Analogy abounds also in
other parts of his scientific thought, especially in biology; and when
he talks of metaphor in the Rhetoric, analogical metaphor is to the
fore and may be seen as subsuming the other forms. In noting this as
a topic for inquiry, I do not suppose that all talk of analogy on
Aristotle's part is metaphorical or that his metaphysics, or the phi-
losophy of Plato either, has to be thought of as at bottom a peculiar
form of poetic discourse. It is merely to recognise, at the end of the
paper as at the beginning, that there is an ongoing debate, set off
especially by Derrida, about the extent to which philosophy draws its
life from metaphor or is held captive within the metaphorical.
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